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FRAUD – RIGHTS OF ACTION AND DEFENSES: 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
THE ASSERTION OF A DECEIT CLAIM 
Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 
2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d 715 
ABSTRACT 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the statute of frauds is not a 
defense to a tort claim for deceit, even when the underlying damages 
resulted from an unenforceable contract.  Early English common law 
allowed a claimant to prevail on a breach of contract action using oral 
testimony alone.  As a result, many fraudulent contracts were being 
enforced.  To remedy this situation, in 1677, the English Parliament enacted 
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, commonly known as the 
statute of frauds.  The statute required certain contracts to be evidenced by 
writing, otherwise the contract would be unenforceable.  Contract and tort 
law were intertwined as one cause of action until the Court of the King’s 
Bench distinguished the two claims in its decision in Pasley v. Freeman in 
1789. 
By the nineteenth century United States courts began to develop their 
own common law.  The states, however are still divided on how the statute 
of frauds applies to an action in deceit.  Some state courts combine contract 
law and tort law, which in essence allows the statute of frauds to be used as 
a defense to a deceit claim.  While other states find contract law and tort 
law are separate, and do not allow the statute of frauds to defend an action 
for deceit.  This was an issue of first impression in North Dakota.  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court, in its holding in Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. 
Riemer, concluded contract law and tort law are distinct, and therefore, the 
statute of frauds does not preclude the assertion of a deceit claim. 
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I. FACTS 
In January and February 2008, Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. (“Irish Oil”) 
entered into oil and gas leases with the “Riemers”1 for a single parcel of 
land they owned jointly.2  A Letter Agreement in Lieu of a Draft for Oil and 
Gas Lease Bonus Consideration accompanied each lease, offering a bonus 
 
1. The parties to the lawsuit, collectively known as the “Riemers” are:  Gerald C. Riemer, 
Doris E. Riemer, Lillie J. Riemer, and Joanne Johnson.  Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 
22, 794 N.W.2d 715. 
2. Id. ¶ 2, 794 N.W.2d at 716. 
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consideration payment to be made within sixty days and a one-sixth royalty 
payment.3 
On March 24, 2008, Gerald C. Riemer (“Riemer”) called Irish Oil and 
spoke with the company’s landman, Clarence Hertz.4  Riemer asked why 
the first bonus payment had not yet arrived.5  T.P. Furlong, the vice 
president for Irish Oil, called Riemer on March 25, 2008, stating there were 
title issues and requested an extension of time to pay the bonus 
consideration.6  Riemer gave Irish Oil the impression he was the advocate 
for the family, and he allegedly gave approval for the extension.7  T. P. 
Furlong mailed a letter memorializing the conversation he had with Riemer 
on March 25, 2008.8  Riemer did not respond to the letter.9 
On April 30, 2008, the Riemers signed an oil and gas lease with 
Continental Oil Company for the mineral rights which had been leased to 
Irish Oil.10  On May 26, 2008, Irish Oil sent Riemer a check for 
$10,640.00.11  Riemer sent the check back to Irish Oil with a note stating, 
“sorry I leased it to another company.”12 
On October 6, 2008, Irish Oil sued the Riemers for breach of the leases, 
and on September 1, 2009, requested leave to amend the complaint to add a 
claim against Riemer for deceit.13  All parties filed motions for Summary 
Judgment.14  The district court denied Irish Oil’s motion to amend its 
 
3. Id. ¶ 2.  The letter stated, 
Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. is interested in acquiring an oil and gas lease on the above 
referenced mineral interest, which you appear to own mineral interest, and is offering 
a bonus consideration payment of $160.00 per acre, for a primary term of five years, 
and a 1/6th  royalty in the event of production . . . .  Within 60 days upon receipt of the 
signed lease, and subject to approval of title, with right of payment extension of 30 
additional days, in the event of title curative issues, from expiration of original 60 
days, you will receive a check in the amount of $10,640.00.  On January 15, 2009 you 
will receive the balance of bonus consideration in the amount of $10,640.00.  Id. 
4. Id. ¶ 3. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. ¶ 4, 794 N.W.2d at 717. 
8. Id. ¶ 3.  The letter stated: 
Please accept our apologies for the delay. . . . We through examination of title have 
encountered title issues . . . we will have to further examine documents. . . . This may 
take as long as the first of June, but if it takes longer than June 15th we will contact 
you to either extend the time to pay or release our leases of record.  [I]f this does not 
correctly memorialize our conversation please feel free to contact me. . . . Id. 
9. Brief for Respondent at 5, Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d 715, 
(No. 20100064). 
10. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 4, 794 N.W.2d at 717. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  Lillie J. Riemer also voided a check she received from Irish Oil after May 17, 2008.  
Id. 
13. Id. ¶ 5. 
14. Id. 
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complaint, concluding no valid modification of the leases were made and 
any dispute over the facts related to the modification was irrelevant.15  The 
district court held the provision in the lease requiring judicial determination 
of a breach was not applicable to the circumstances.16  The district court 
granted Riemers’ motions for Summary Judgment, dismissing Irish Oil’s 
complaint with prejudice.17 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. EARLY ENGLISH LAW FOR CONTRACTS AND TORTS 
Deceit occurs when a party willfully or recklessly misleads another 
party to act on a false claim.18  The early English courts were highly 
controversial with regard to deceit claims for contractual breaches.19  In one 
of the earliest recorded cases, the Court of Common Pleas held a 
contractual matter may be converted, after the fact, into a claim for deceit.20  
Later, in 1415, the same court held “if this action [breach of promise] is 
maintained, one shall have trespass for breach of any covenant in the 
world.”21  In 1423, the Justices were unanimous holding there could be no 
cause of action for the breach of an oral promise.22 
1. Assumpsit:  The Remedy for Breach of Contract 
In early medieval common law, claims seeking the repayment of a debt 
or other matters could only be pursued through a writ of debt.23  Covenant 
was not applicable to oral promises, and the promise was not the heart of 
the theory for the action in debt.24  An action in debt was available to 
plaintiffs “who orally promised to pay,” and in cases “in which no promise 
had been made at all.”25  The “attendant circumstances . . . were the basis of 
the legal obligation,” not the promise itself.26 
 
15. Id. ¶ 6. 
16. Id. ¶ 8. 
17. Id. ¶ 9, 794 N.W.2d at 718. 
18. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., THE LAW OF TORTS:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS IN OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 348 (1894). 
19. See, James Barr Ames, The History of Assumpsit, in Select Essays in Anglo-American 
Legal History 155, 160 (Committee of the Association of American Law Schools ed., 1909). 
20. Id. at 161. 
21. Id. at 160. 
22. Id.  
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By the middle of the sixteenth century, lawyers had created an action in 
assumpsit.27  Assumpsit is a common law legal remedy for breach of 
promise or breach of contract.28  Under assumpsit, oral promises were 
enforced and judgment could be obtained by the “oral testimony of 
witnesses.”29  The Queen’s Bench expanded assumpsit, allowing a cause of 
action “without an express promise.”30  For many years these judgments 
were reversed by the Exchequer Chamber; however, “the Queen’s Bench 
refused to be bound by these reversals.”31  Slades Case32 has been credited 
with the origin of actions on assumpsit, and it put an end to the conflicts 
between the Queen’s Bench and Exchequer Chamber.33  However, an 
action in assumpsit fostered perjury by “excluding the best evidence, the 
testimony of parties, their spouses and other interested persons . . . [and] 
jurors were permitted to reach conclusions based on personal notions or 
capricious concerns.”34  The English Parliament addressed the issue in 1677 
when it enacted “An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries.”35 
Prior to 1789, an action for deceit was tied together with an action for 
breach of contract.36  The original writ from 1201 was only applicable 
“where a legal procedure had been misused to petitioner’s detriment.”37  
However, later remedies included “actual damages caused by 
fraudulent . . . transactions.”38  In 1789, the decision in Pasley v. Freeman39 
separated the two actions, making it possible for a party in contract to sue a 
third party outside the contract for deceit.40 
2. Derry v. Peek:  Proof of Fraud 
The line of cases from Pasley in 1789 to Derry v. Peek41 in 1889 
established early precedent for proof of fraud.42  In 1801, the Court of the 
 
27. See, Ames, supra note 19, at 157. 
28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (3d ed. 2006). 
29. BROWN, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 3. 
30. Ames, supra note 19, at 163. 
31. Id. 
32. (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B.); 4 Co. Rep. 91 a, 92 b. 
33. Ames, supra note 19, at 163.  “[T]he final triumph of [the Queen’s Bench] is signalized 
by Slade’s Case . . . .  All the judges of England resolved . . . ‘every contract . . . implied an 
assumpsit.’”  Id. 
34. BROWN, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 4. 
35. George N. Stepaniuk, The Statute of Frauds as a Bar to an Action in Tort for Fraud, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1985). 
36. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 443 (3d ed. 2006). 
37. 9 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 32:3, at 211 (1992). 
38. Id. 
39. (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.) 450; S.T.R. 51. 
40. HARPER, supra note 36, at 443-44. 
41. (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 337 (Eng.). 
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King’s Bench held the defendant must know of the falsity of his statement 
in order to be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.43  Thirty years later the 
Court of Common Pleas used the term “fraud in law,” holding a defendant 
may be guilty of fraud if he or she knew the representations were false, 
regardless of malicious intent.44  In 1832, the Court of the King’s Bench 
held the law requires a person to knowingly make a false representation 
with the intent to induce another person to act on the promise, and that the 
person incurs damage from relying upon the misrepresentation.45  Ten years 
later the Court of Exchequer held the defendant liable for the injuries even 
if the defendant did not know his representation was false.46  In 1879, the 
Court of Appeals held the misrepresentation must have been made with 
malice.47 
In 1889, the House of Lords put an end to the conflicting rulings on 
actions for deceit through its holding in Derry.48  First, the court defined 
fraud as, “a false representation . . . made knowingly, or without belief in its 
truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false.”49  Next, it 
held a careless statement may be evidence of fraud, but the statement alone 
is not sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.50  Finally, the court 
established the elements required to prove fraud.51  However, Derry has 
been rejected by many of the American courts, specifically the element 
requiring intent to deceive.52 
 
42. Derry, L.R. 14 App. Cas. at 369. 
43. Haycraft v. Creasy, (1801) 102 E.R. 303 (Eng.). 
44. Foster v. Charles, (1830) 7 Bing 105, 106 (Eng.). 
45. Polhill v. Walter, (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 43 (K.B.), 46, 3 B. & Ad. 114, 123 (Eng.). 
46. Taylor v. Ashton, (1843) 11 M. & W. 401 (Eng.). 
47. Arkwright v. Newbold, (1879) 17 Ch. D. 301 (Eng.). 
48. Derry v. Peek, (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (Eng.). 
49. Id. at 337. 
50. Id. at 369. 
51. Id. at 374.  The established elements are: 
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and nothing 
short of that will suffice.  Secondly fraud is proved when it is shewn [sic] that a false 
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) 
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false . . . . Thirdly, if fraud be proved, the 
motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial. 
Id. 
52. See Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1960) (stating “an intent 
to deceive is no longer necessary”); Nielsen v. Adams, 388 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Neb. 1986) (noting 
the court has not consistently used “intent to deceive” as an element of fraud); William L. Prosser, 
Misrepresentation and Third Persons, VAND. L. REV. 231, 235 (1966) (stating the American 
courts held “that the deceit action would lie for negligent statements”). 
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B. THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION TO ORAL PROMISES:  AN ACT FOR 
 PREVENTION OF FRAUDS AND PERJURIES 
Under the law of assumpsit, it was easy to “create” a cause of action.53  
Oral promises were being enforced on the strength of oral testimony, and 
granting fraudulent actions was common.54  Parties to a lawsuit were not 
allowed to testify as witnesses; therefore, the only way to establish the 
validity of an oral contract was to have a third party act as a witness.55  In 
response to this problem, the English Parliament enacted “An Act for 
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries.”56 
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, commonly known as 
the statute of frauds, was enacted in 1677.57  There were twenty-four 
sections dealing with leases, conveyances of land, wills, trusts, contracts, 
and executions of judgments.58  Sections four and seventeen ultimately 
“declared that certain types of oral promises should not be enforceable at 
all.”59  The Act was enacted to stop corruption in the legal system.60 
1. The United States Adopts the Statute of Frauds 
The United States adopted only six of the original twenty-four 
provisions of the statute of frauds.61  Individual states have adopted the 
statute, but generally have made changes to the provisions.62 For instance, 
North Dakota has adopted classes b, d, and e, and added two additional 
provisions: an agreement to lend money in aggregate of $25,000, and an 
agreement to alter a contract for payment of money in aggregate of 
$25,000.63 Montana, on the other hand, adopted classes b, c, d, and e, and 
added an agreement authorizing an agent to purchase or sell real estate.64 
 
53. BROWN, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 4. 
54. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1231. 
55. St. Ansgar Mills, Inc. v. Streit, 613 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Iowa 2000). 
56. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1231. 
57. Id. 
58. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car II c. 3 §§ 1-24 (Eng.). 
59. BROWN, supra note 23, § 12.1, at 5. 
60. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1232. 
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).  The classes of contracts within 
the statute of frauds are: 
(a) a contract of an executor or administrator to answer for a duty of his 
decedent . . . (b) a contract to answer for the duty of another . . . (c) a contract made 
upon consideration of marriage . . . (d) a contract for the sale of an interest in 
land . . . (e) a contract that is not to be performed within one year from the making 
thereof . . . .  Id.
 
62. Id. 
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1943). 
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903 (2009). 
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The Montana statute further states evidence of the agreement “is not 
admissible without the writing or secondary evidence of the writing’s 
contents.”65 
2. Applying the Statute of Frauds to a Tort Claim 
Courts have held permitting an action of deceit for a promissory 
statement would in some cases violate the policy of the statute of frauds.66 
If the contract is not in writing there is no valid breach, and therefore, no 
duty was created in the defendant.67 Fraud cannot be predicated upon acts in 
which the party is not obligated by law to do.68 The policy behind the 
statute of frauds is to prevent fraudulent claims.69 If the court allows the 
action for deceit based on an oral promise, which should have been written, 
the court would be enforcing a contract which is in violation of the statute 
of frauds.70 However, when the statute of frauds is used to bar the 
enforcement of a true oral contract it actually “sanctions fraud by allowing 
wrongdoers to break their oral promises with impunity.”71 Therefore, an 
action in tort would be an appropriate remedy despite the statute of frauds.72 
Many states recognize the potential for injustice associated with the 
statute of frauds prohibiting a legitimate action for deceit.73 Massachusetts 
has held when factual misrepresentations constitute a wrong, rather than a 
mere breach of promise, and start a chain of events which lead to loss, “the 
promisor may be estopped from raising the Statute of Frauds as a 
defense.”74  New Hampshire allows parol evidence so long as the court does 
not enforce the terms of the contract, but instead recognizes an 
“independent and distinct” claim exists.75  Furthermore, New Hampshire 
has held barring an action in deceit merely because the statute of frauds is 
being raised as a defense would “foster an injustice,” not further the policy 
of the statute.76  Oregon allows the oral testimony because it is not being 
used “to establish an agreement, but to prove fraud.”77  Rhode Island 
 
65. Id. § 28-2-903(2). 
66. W. Page Keeton, Fraud – Statements of Intention, TEX. L. REV. 185, 201 (1937). 
67. Franklin Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 65 Ind. 549 (Ind. 1879). 
68. Id. 
69. Keeton, supra note 66, at 201. 
70. Id. 
71. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1232. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Hurwitz v. Bocian, 670 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
75. Morgan v. Morgan, 47 A.2d 569, 571 (N.H. 1946). 
76. Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (N.H. 1978).  
77. Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Or. 1936). 
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overruled more than ninety years of precedent when the state supreme court 
held the statute of frauds does not apply to a tort claim in deceit.78  The 
court further concluded to use the statute in this manner would sanction 
injustice rather than prevent it.79 
Despite this trend, some states are still concerned courts will indirectly 
enforce an unenforceable contract by granting the plaintiff a cause of action 
in tort.80  The court cannot allow the plaintiff to maintain a tort claim in 
which the damages are essentially the same as the breach of contract.81  
Florida courts have held the statute of frauds is a bar to actions “seeking 
indirectly to enforce oral contracts, including actions for fraud and 
deceit . . . ” even when the defendant did not intend to honor the oral 
promise.82  However, under Florida law, a cause of action for deceit is 
allowed when the plaintiff can prove separate damages resulting from the 
fraud.83  Indiana courts “resist efforts by a plaintiff to get around limitations 
imposed by contract law by recasting a breach as a tort . . . .”84  Utah will 
allow the action so long as the “gravamen of the action” is for tort and not 
breach of contract.85 
The states have made an attempt to apply the statute of frauds in 
accordance with its original purpose; however, treating it as an absolute bar 
to present evidence extends beyond the scope.  It is important to note, the 
English Parliament did not intend for the statute to act as a complete 
defense to evidence of a fraud.86  Applying the statute as a complete 
defense creates more fraud than it prevents.87  In order to stop this misuse, 
the courts should allow the plaintiff to present evidence of a fraud even 
when that evidence is an oral promise.88  If the statute is to “remain a 
credible deterrent against fraud” the states must reach a balancing point to 
prevent an unlawful contract, while also allowing a separate action in tort.89 
 
78. Bourdon’s Inc. v. Ecin Indus., Inc., 704 A.2d 747, 757 (R.I. 1997). 
79. Id. 
80. Classic Cheesecake Co., Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 839, 841 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
81. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 95 (2001). 
82. The Mark Andrews of the Palm Beaches, Ltd. v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., 265 
F.Supp.2d 366, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
83. Id. 
84. Classic Cheesecake Co., Inc., 546 F.3d at 841. 
85. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 274 P. 856, 860 (Utah 1929). 
86. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1231. 
87. Id. at 1232-33. 
88. Id. at 1247. 
89. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THE STATUTE OF 
 FRAUDS DOES NOT BAR A TORT ACTION FOR DECEIT 
Justice Crothers wrote the majority opinion in Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. 
Riemer,90 to which Chief Justice VandeWalle, joined by Justice Sandstrom, 
and Justice Kapsner wrote separate concurring and dissenting opinions.  
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the statute of frauds is a rule of 
evidence and does not act as a complete defense in a tort action.91  First, the 
court addressed Riemers’ contention that a claim for deceit was inapplicable 
to the situation.92  Next, the court determined whether the proposed 
amended complaint would be successful.93  Finally, the majority analyzed 
the reasoning in other jurisdictions in regard to the appropriate application 
of the statute of frauds to a claim for deceit that arises out of a breach of 
contract claim.94 
1. Fraud or Deceit 
The court began its analysis by rejecting the defendants’ argument that 
a deceit claim is not applicable to the situation because Irish Oil and the 
Riemers were parties to a contract.95  The court noted the difference 
between an action in fraud (contractually related) and an action in deceit 
(not contractually related).96  Irish Oil’s proposed amended complaint did 
not seek damages under the terms of the contract.97  Instead, Irish Oil 
sought damages against Riemer for injuries sustained when it relied upon 
the extra-contractual statements made by Riemer.98  The court concluded 
“the statute of frauds prevented [Riemer’s] oral promise from being a new 
contract, and the lack of execution made modification of the existing 
 
90. 2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d 715. 
91. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 51, 794 N.W.2d at 729. 
92. Id. ¶ 32, 794 N.W.2d at 723. 
93. Id. ¶¶ 34-38, 794 N.W.2d at 724-25. 
94. Id. ¶¶ 39-51, 794 N.W.2d at 725-29. 
95. Id. ¶ 32, 794 N.W.2d at 723. 
96. Id. ¶ 33; see Gunderson v. Havana-Clyde Mining Co., 133 N.W. 554, 555 (N.D. 1911); 
see also, Erickson v. Brown, 2008 ND 57, ¶ 62, 747 N.W.2d 34, 53 (stating, “[f]raud is a claim 
available to a contracting party seeking rescission due to ineffective consent.”  Irish Oil & Gas, 
Inc., ¶ 62, 794 N.W.2d at 731.  “Deceit is a tort claim available when a party has breached an 
obligation imposed by law to honestly deal with another party.”  Id. ¶ 66, 794 N.W.2d at 732. 
97. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d 715, 
(No. 20100064). 
98. Id. 
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contract ineffective. Thus, no contractually related misrepresentation claim 
(fraud) is available to Irish Oil.”99 
2. The Cause of Action 
The court considered Irish Oil’s proposed amendment, and determined 
it was not futile because, “if proven, [it] would entitle the plaintiff to relief 
against the defendant on some cognizable theory.”100  Irish Oil alleged 
“Gerald Riemer had no intention of honoring his oral commitment to 
modify the terms of the Bonus Agreement . . . ,” and “Gerald Riemer 
intended for Plaintiff to rely on his fraudulent misrepresentation . . . .”101  
The court noted “a promise made without any intention of performing” falls 
within the North Dakota statute for deceit; therefore, both of the allegations 
state a claim for relief under the law.102 
3. The Jurisdictional Divide:  Using the Statute of Frauds as a 
 Defense to a Tort Claim in Deceit 
A person who makes a promise to perform, but has no intention to 
honor the promise, is guilty of misrepresentation.103  An action in deceit can 
be made regardless of whether the contract can be enforced.104  “The same 
is true when the agreement is oral and made unenforceable by the statute of 
frauds . . . .”105  The issue before the court was whether the statute of frauds 
can serve as a defense in a non-contractual tort action.106  In its analysis, the 
court applied four principles.107 First, was the oral agreement an “essential 
element” to the deceit claim?108  Second, is the petitioner attempting to 
indirectly enforce the oral contract?109  Third, can testimony of the oral 
 
99. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 33, 794 N.W.2d at 723. 
100. Id. ¶ 35, 794 N.W.2d at 724. 
101. Id. ¶ 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102. Id. ¶¶ 36-37; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-02 (1943). 
103. Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Or. 1936); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 530(1) (1977). 
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c. 
105. Id. 
106. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 39, 794 N.W.2d at 725. 
107.  Id. ¶¶ 39-51, 794 N.W.2d at 725-29. 
108. See Hurwitz v. Bocian, 670 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Fericks v. Lucy 
Ann Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Utah 2004). 
109. See The Mark Andrews of the Palm Beaches, Ltd. v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., 
265 F.Supp.2d 366, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Fericks, 100 P.3d at 1205; Papanikolas v. Sampson, 
274 P. 856, 859 (Utah 1929). 
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agreement be used to prove fraud?110  Fourth, will the statute of frauds 
perpetrate a fraud when used as a defense in a tort action?111 
a. Essential Element of the Claim 
The statute of frauds does not bar all tort actions, only those in which 
the oral contract is an “essential element” to the claim.112  “If the proof of 
the promise . . . within the statute is essential to maintain it, there can be no 
recovery unless the statute is satisfied.”113  “Where the oral contract . . . is a 
mere circumstance or incident of a fraud it may be shown in an action in 
tort for damages . . . .”114 
For example, the parties enter into an oral agreement to purchase land, 
in which the seller later refuses to perform.  The essential element is the 
transfer of property.  The statute of frauds would prevent this action from 
proceeding because the court would ultimately be enforcing an 
unenforceable contract.115  In the alternative, parties to a written contract for 
the sale of land, make an extra-contractual oral agreement to extend time 
for the buyer to make the escrow payment.  If the seller rescinds the 
contract when the escrow payment is not made pursuant to the written 
contract, the buyer can sue in tort on the oral promise because it is a mere 
circumstance of fraud.116 
The alleged oral promise made by Riemer to Irish Oil was a mere 
circumstance of fraud.  The parties had a written contract in which Irish Oil 
would lease the Riemers land.117  The parties had an extra-contractual 
agreement in which Riemer allegedly agreed to extend time for Irish Oil to 
make the bonus payment.118  When Irish Oil did not make the payment per 
the written contract terms, the Riemers rescinded the contract.119  The 
essential element of the claim is not the written lease, it is the breached 
promise.120 
 
110. See Labarre v. Shepard, 84 F.3d 496, 500 (1st Cir. 1996); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 55 
P.2d 1122, 1127-28 (Or. 1936); Bourdon’s, Inc. v. Ecin Indus., Inc., 704 A.2d 747, 756 (R.I. 
1997). 
111. See Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (N.H. 1978); Morgan v. Morgan, 47 
A.2d 569, 571 (N.H. 1946); Bourdon’s, Inc., 704 A.2d at 756. 
112. Fericks, 100 P.3d at 1204.  See also Hurwitz, 670 N.E.2d at 412. 
113. Fericks, 100 P.3d at 1204. 
114. Id. 
115 Id. at 1204-05. 
116. Id. 
117. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 2, 794 N.W.2d 715, 716. 
118. Id. ¶ 31, 794 N.W.2d at 723. 
119. Id. ¶ 4, 794 N.W.2d at 717. 
120. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 11. 
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b. Indirect Enforcement of an Oral Contract 
The statute of frauds bars actions which seek to indirectly enforce an 
oral contract.121  To proceed in a tort action the plaintiff must be able to 
show the damages incurred are separate from the breach of contract.122  For 
example, a buyer who relies upon an oral agreement from a seller to extend 
the payment date, would have two separate causes of action when the seller 
does not perform, and the buyer loses the benefit of the contract and the 
down payment.123  Under these circumstances, the seller did not breach the 
contract; however, by dishonoring the oral promise, the seller injured the 
buyer by the loss of the deposit and any financial gain from the sale.124  The 
court would find the damages are separate from those incurred from the 
breach of contract, and allow the buyer to recover in tort.125 
The statute of frauds is a defense to a tort action if the court concludes 
the gravamen of the action is for breach of contract; and therefore, a 
disguised claim.126  For example, a buyer cannot sue the seller in tort for 
failing to honor an oral promise to sell land when the damages are for the 
value of the land not received.127  Seeking damages “equal in amount to the 
difference in the actual value of the property . . . and the amount . . . to [be 
paid] for it under the alleged promises . . . ” is a disguised claim.128  The 
core of the action is breach of contract.129 
Riemer’s alleged oral promise did not modify the written contract, and 
Irish Oil’s complaint was not for breach of contract.130  There are two 
separate complaints; one for breach of contract, and the other one for 
deceit.131  Irish Oil’s original complaint was for breach of contract.132  The 
lease agreement was written and met the statute of frauds requirements.133  
The oral promise did not need to be evidenced by writing because it is not 
the type of contract in which the statute requires a writing.134  Therefore, the 
 
121. The Mark Andrews of the Palm Beaches, Ltd. v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., 265 
F.Supp.2d 366, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
122. Id. 
123. See Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust., 100 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Utah 2004). 
124. See id. at 1202. 
125. See id. at 1204. 
126. The Mark Andrews of the Palm Beaches, Ltd., 265 F.Supp.2d at 382; see Papanikolas v. 
Sampson, 274 P. 856, 860 (Utah 1929). 
127. Papanikolas, 274 P. at 857. 
128. Id. at 860. 
129. Id. 
130. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 51, 794 N.W.2d 715, 729. 
131. Id. ¶ 5, 794 N.W.2d at 717. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1943). 
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lower court would not indirectly enforce an unenforceable contract if it 
allowed Irish Oil’s complaint for deceit. 
c. Admissibility of Oral Testimony 
The statute of frauds does not make the testimony of an oral promise 
inadmissible if the purpose of the testimony is to prove fraud and not to 
enforce a contract.135  The statute of frauds was enacted to stop the common 
place enforcement of fraudulent contracts.136  The statute does not contain 
any language in regard to the use of oral testimony.137  Furthermore, a 
defendant may use the oral agreement in defense of its actions or 
inactions.138 
In Bourdon’s Inc. v. Ecin Industries, Inc.,139 the defendant relied upon 
the plaintiff’s oral promise to use the defendant as a subcontractor to 
manufacture mattresses and futons.140  The defendant relied on the promise 
and purchased special equipment necessary to make the furniture.141  The 
court allowed the defendant to admit the plaintiff’s oral promise into 
evidence in order to support its defense.142  The defendant did not want to 
enforce the oral contract, but to show why it defaulted on the loan payments 
to the plaintiff.143  Similarly, Irish Oil intended to use Riemer’s oral 
statement in its defense to show why it did not pay the bonus payment on 
time.144  Under these circumstances, the statute of frauds would not bar the 
oral testimony of the promise because it is not being used to enforce the 
contract. 
d. Perpetration of Fraud 
The statute of frauds cannot be used as a defense when the defendant 
intended to defraud the plaintiff at the commencement of the agreement.145  
 
135. See Labarre v. Shepard, 84 F.3d 496, 501 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding “evidence of the 
alleged oral agreement was admissible for purposes other than enforcing that agreement . . . .”); 
see also Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Or. 1936) (holding “in an action for 
deceit . . . the statute does not have the effect of rendering inadmissible testimony of an oral 
promise made with the fraudulent intent on the part of the promisor . . . .”). 
136. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1231. 
137. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car II c. 3 §§ 1-24 (Eng.). 
138. See Bourdon’s Inc. v. Ecin Indus., Inc., 704 A.2d 747, 756 (R.I. 1997). 
139. 704 A.2d 747 (R.I. 1997). 
140. Bourdon’s Inc., 704 A.2d at 750. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 756. 
143. Id. at 750. 
144. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 7. 
145. Morgan v. Morgan, 47 A.2d 569, 571 (N.H. 1946); see also Keeton, supra note 66, at 
201.  “[I]t does not follow that in a case where the promisor was being dishonest at the time the 
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“If the speaker makes a promise and at the same time intends not to 
perform . . . this is a proper basis for an action in deceit.”146  Applying the 
statute of frauds defense here would “foster an injustice.”147  It would allow 
the defendant to use the statute of frauds to “perpetrate a fraud.”148 
In the case of Munson v. Raudonis,149 the decedent promised the 
plaintiff “she would get everything after they died,” but prepared a will that 
devised the estate between five people.150  A promise to transfer property 
falls within the statute of frauds;151 however, the decedent did not intend to 
keep her promise at the time she made it.152  The court held the defendant 
could not use the statute of frauds as a defense because it would cause an 
injustice.153 
Irish Oil claimed when Riemer gave Irish Oil an extension to make the 
bonus payment, he had no intention to honor the promise.154  Furthermore, 
he gave Irish Oil the impression he was speaking for the family.155  Irish Oil 
relied upon Riemer’s statement to its detriment.156  The court found there 
was factual support in the record of a conversation between Riemer and 
Irish Oil, and the parties discussed an extension of time to make the bonus 
payment.157  Therefore, the court will allow the claim to be pursued by Irish 
Oil, and not let Riemer hide behind the statute.158 
IV. IMPACT 
The interpretation of the statute of frauds determines whether the 
statute will bar a tort claim for deceit.159  The state courts have construed 
the language of the statute in three ways:  a substantive rule of law, a rule of 
evidence, and a remedial rule.160  Montana and Minnesota apply the statute 
 
contract was made, he should be permitted to hide behind the Statute of Frauds, or use the Statute 
of Frauds itself as a means of perpetrating a fraud.”  Id. 
146. Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (N.H. 1978). 
147. Id; see also Bourdon’s Inc. v. Ecin Indus., Inc., 704 A.2d 747, 757 (R.I. 1997) (stating 
“invoking the Statute of Frauds in cases like the one at bar would exploit the statute as an engine 
of fraud and would ‘sanction rather than prevent an injustice’”). 
148. Munson, 387 A.2d at 1176. 
149. 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1978). 
150. Munson, 387 A.2d  at 1175. 
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(d) (1981). 
152. Munson, 387 A.2d at 1175. 
153. Id. at 1176. 
154. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 97, at 8. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 37, 794 N.W.2d 715, 724. 
158. Id. 
159. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1237. 
160. Id. at 1238-40. 
          
758 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:743 
as a substantive rule of law.161  As a substantive rule, an oral promise may 
not be used to support any cause of action.162  North Dakota has 
acknowledged the error in applying a blanket rule prohibiting oral 
testimony to prove an element in a tort action, and has applied the statute as 
a rule of evidence.163  The statute is a valid defense to a breach of contract 
claim, but does not bar an action in fraud.164  Under the remedial rule, 
courts allow oral evidence to show certain elements, for example, a promise 
was made with fraudulent intent.165 
The statute of frauds has been used to perpetrate fraud as much as 
prevent it.166  To prevent this abuse in North Dakota the court set up four 
guiding principles for future actions.167  One, the statute of frauds can bar 
an action in deceit if the oral contract is the “essential element” to the 
claim.168  Two, the statute of frauds will prohibit the use of oral testimony 
that seeks to indirectly enforce the oral contract.169  Three, the statute of 
frauds does not prevent the use of oral testimony necessary for the plaintiff 
to prove fraud.170  Four, the statute of frauds cannot be used as a tool to 
perpetrate a fraud.171 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted the prevalent rule among the 
states is the statute of frauds is not a valid defense to a tort action.172  The 
statute of frauds is a defense in contractual disputes, and the courts should 
not expand its scope to cover tort actions.  The rule adopted by North 
Dakota strikes an appropriate balance to this jurisdictional dispute by 
preventing unlawful contracts, and allowing a separate action in tort. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The English Parliament intended for the statute of frauds to prevent 
fraud,173 and the North Dakota Supreme Court adhered to this intent in its 
holding in Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer.174  Riemer attempted to use the 
 
161. Id. at 1238. 
162. Id. 
163. Id; see Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22 ¶ 51, 794 N.W.2d 715, 729. 
164. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1239. 
165. Id. at 1240. 
166. Id. at 1232. 
167. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶¶ 39-51, 794 N.W.2d at 725-29. 
168. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a; Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 41, 794 N.W.2d at 725. 
169. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.b; Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 41, 794 N.W.2d at 725. 
170. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c; Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶¶ 42-47, 794 N.W.2d at 726-
28. 
171. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.d; Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶¶ 42-43, 794 N.W.2d at 726. 
172. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 39, 794 N.W.2d at 725. 
173. Stepaniuk, supra note 35, at 1233. 
174. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc., ¶ 51, 794 N.W.2d at 729. 
          
2011] CASE COMMENT 759 
statute of frauds as a defense to his alleged misrepresentation to Irish Oil.175  
The court concluded the statute prevented the alleged oral statement from 
modifying the written contract.176  Additionally, the court held the statute 
did not preclude Irish Oil’s assertion of the deceit claim, because an action 
in tort is separate from an action for breach of contract.177 
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